There are accordingly intellectual virtues and moral virtues. Corresponding to these two broad divisions in humanity there are two functions of reason, the intellectual and the moral, and each has its own virtues. The moral person employs all of his or her capacities, physical, and mental. Virtue does not imply the negation or rejection of any of these natural capacities.
#Moral virtues and vices list full#
Human nature consists for Aristotle not simply in rationally but in the full range covered by the vegetative, sensitive or appetitive, and the rational soul. In this way we can combine all aspects of human behavior. Another way to describe Aristotle’s concept of virtue is to consider each virtue as the product of the rational control of the passions. In a general way we have already defined virtue as the fulfillment of humanity’s distinctive function and as the mean between extremes. We might label the vices “favoritism” and “discrimination.” Justice - consists in a propensity to give or return to a person the right amount (what is due to them), whereas injustice allots them either more or less than what is due.
To feel pleasure at the bad fortune of others, regardless of desert, is malice. To feel pain at all good fortune, whether deserved or not, is envy. It also means feeling pain at undeserved bad fortune and pleasure when people get their comeuppance. Moderation consists in feeling pain at good fortune which is contrary to desert (when bad people do well), and pleasure when the good fortune is deserved. Righteous Indignation (nemesis) – is moderation in one’s tendency to feel pain at the good fortune of others or pleasure at their bad fortune. Shyness or bashfulness is the excess, and the deficiency is shamelessness. Modesty or a sense of shame – is moderation in one’s susceptibility to shame or embarrassment. The excess is obsequiousness, and the deficiency is quarrelsomeness. Excess desire is buffoonery, and deficient desire is boorishness.įriendliness – is moderation in the desire to please others generally. Wittiness – is moderation in the desire to amuse others. Truthfulness – is what Aristotle called moderation in one’s presentation of oneself, with boastfulness as the excess and self-deprecation as the deficiency. The vice of excess is irascibility or irritableness, of deficiency is spiritlessness or passivity (there’s not a good word for it). Good temper – is moderation in one’s proneness to anger. The deficiency we just call “lack of ambition.” There was no name for this virtue in Greek, and in English we use the same word both for the virtue and for the vice of excess (maybe we have trouble distinguishing them). Desiring less than one deserves is excessive humility.Īmbition – is similar to pride but pertains to smaller honors. Desiring more than one deserves is vanity. The mean here is defined by what one deserves. Pride or High-Mindedness – is moderation in one’s desire for or tendency to demand great honors.
Magnificence or Munificence – has the same nature as generosity but applies to large public expenditures. The tendency to accept too much and give too little is stinginess.
The tendency to give in excess and accept too little is spendthriftiness or prodigality. Generosity or Liberality – is moderation in the size of the gifts one is prone to give or accept. Deficiency has no common name, but may be labeled “insensitivity.” Temperance – is moderation in the desire for physical pleasures. Deficiency of fear and excess of confidence produce rashness or foolhardiness. Excess in the propensity to fear combined with deficiency in the propensity to be confident constitutes cowardice. Consequently, I begin with narrative descriptions of each virtue.Ĭourage – is moderation in the tendencies to feel fear and boldness or confidence.
While it is helpful to see Aristotle’s list of virtues and vices laid out schematically, some of these are complicated enough that the abbreviated descriptions that fit on a chart are misleading.